--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/mupdf-source/thirdparty/curl/src/tool_doswin.c	Mon Sep 15 11:43:07 2025 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,729 @@
+/***************************************************************************
+ *                                  _   _ ____  _
+ *  Project                     ___| | | |  _ \| |
+ *                             / __| | | | |_) | |
+ *                            | (__| |_| |  _ <| |___
+ *                             \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2019, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ *
+ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+ * are also available at https://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
+ *
+ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
+ *
+ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
+ * KIND, either express or implied.
+ *
+ ***************************************************************************/
+#include "tool_setup.h"
+
+#if defined(MSDOS) || defined(WIN32)
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBGEN_H) && defined(HAVE_BASENAME)
+#  include <libgen.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WIN32
+#  include <tlhelp32.h>
+#  include "tool_cfgable.h"
+#  include "tool_libinfo.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "tool_bname.h"
+#include "tool_doswin.h"
+
+#include "memdebug.h" /* keep this as LAST include */
+
+/*
+ * Macros ALWAYS_TRUE and ALWAYS_FALSE are used to avoid compiler warnings.
+ */
+
+#define ALWAYS_TRUE   (1)
+#define ALWAYS_FALSE  (0)
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(__POCC__)
+#  undef ALWAYS_TRUE
+#  undef ALWAYS_FALSE
+#  if (_MSC_VER < 1500)
+#    define ALWAYS_TRUE   (0, 1)
+#    define ALWAYS_FALSE  (1, 0)
+#  else
+#    define ALWAYS_TRUE \
+__pragma(warning(push)) \
+__pragma(warning(disable:4127)) \
+(1) \
+__pragma(warning(pop))
+#    define ALWAYS_FALSE \
+__pragma(warning(push)) \
+__pragma(warning(disable:4127)) \
+(0) \
+__pragma(warning(pop))
+#  endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WIN32
+#  undef  PATH_MAX
+#  define PATH_MAX MAX_PATH
+#endif
+
+#ifndef S_ISCHR
+#  ifdef S_IFCHR
+#    define S_ISCHR(m) (((m) & S_IFMT) == S_IFCHR)
+#  else
+#    define S_ISCHR(m) (0) /* cannot tell if file is a device */
+#  endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WIN32
+#  define _use_lfn(f) ALWAYS_TRUE   /* long file names always available */
+#elif !defined(__DJGPP__) || (__DJGPP__ < 2)  /* DJGPP 2.0 has _use_lfn() */
+#  define _use_lfn(f) ALWAYS_FALSE  /* long file names never available */
+#elif defined(__DJGPP__)
+#  include <fcntl.h>                /* _use_lfn(f) prototype */
+#endif
+
+#ifndef UNITTESTS
+static SANITIZEcode truncate_dryrun(const char *path,
+                                    const size_t truncate_pos);
+#ifdef MSDOS
+static SANITIZEcode msdosify(char **const sanitized, const char *file_name,
+                             int flags);
+#endif
+static SANITIZEcode rename_if_reserved_dos_device_name(char **const sanitized,
+                                                       const char *file_name,
+                                                       int flags);
+#endif /* !UNITTESTS (static declarations used if no unit tests) */
+
+
+/*
+Sanitize a file or path name.
+
+All banned characters are replaced by underscores, for example:
+f?*foo => f__foo
+f:foo::$DATA => f_foo__$DATA
+f:\foo:bar => f__foo_bar
+f:\foo:bar => f:\foo:bar   (flag SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH)
+
+This function was implemented according to the guidelines in 'Naming Files,
+Paths, and Namespaces' section 'Naming Conventions'.
+https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa365247.aspx
+
+Flags
+-----
+SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS:     Allow colons.
+Without this flag colons are sanitized.
+
+SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH:       Allow path separators and colons.
+Without this flag path separators and colons are sanitized.
+
+SANITIZE_ALLOW_RESERVED:   Allow reserved device names.
+Without this flag a reserved device name is renamed (COM1 => _COM1) unless it's
+in a UNC prefixed path.
+
+SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE:   Allow truncating a long filename.
+Without this flag if the sanitized filename or path will be too long an error
+occurs. With this flag the filename --and not any other parts of the path-- may
+be truncated to at least a single character. A filename followed by an
+alternate data stream (ADS) cannot be truncated in any case.
+
+Success: (SANITIZE_ERR_OK) *sanitized points to a sanitized copy of file_name.
+Failure: (!= SANITIZE_ERR_OK) *sanitized is NULL.
+*/
+SANITIZEcode sanitize_file_name(char **const sanitized, const char *file_name,
+                                int flags)
+{
+  char *p, *target;
+  size_t len;
+  SANITIZEcode sc;
+  size_t max_sanitized_len;
+
+  if(!sanitized)
+    return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  *sanitized = NULL;
+
+  if(!file_name)
+    return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  if((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH)) {
+#ifndef MSDOS
+    if(file_name[0] == '\\' && file_name[1] == '\\')
+      /* UNC prefixed path \\ (eg \\?\C:\foo) */
+      max_sanitized_len = 32767-1;
+    else
+#endif
+      max_sanitized_len = PATH_MAX-1;
+  }
+  else
+    /* The maximum length of a filename.
+       FILENAME_MAX is often the same as PATH_MAX, in other words it is 260 and
+       does not discount the path information therefore we shouldn't use it. */
+    max_sanitized_len = (PATH_MAX-1 > 255) ? 255 : PATH_MAX-1;
+
+  len = strlen(file_name);
+  if(len > max_sanitized_len) {
+    if(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) ||
+       truncate_dryrun(file_name, max_sanitized_len))
+      return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
+
+    len = max_sanitized_len;
+  }
+
+  target = malloc(len + 1);
+  if(!target)
+    return SANITIZE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+  strncpy(target, file_name, len);
+  target[len] = '\0';
+
+#ifndef MSDOS
+  if((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) && !strncmp(target, "\\\\?\\", 4))
+    /* Skip the literal path prefix \\?\ */
+    p = target + 4;
+  else
+#endif
+    p = target;
+
+  /* replace control characters and other banned characters */
+  for(; *p; ++p) {
+    const char *banned;
+
+    if((1 <= *p && *p <= 31) ||
+       (!(flags & (SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS|SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH)) && *p == ':') ||
+       (!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) && (*p == '/' || *p == '\\'))) {
+      *p = '_';
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    for(banned = "|<>\"?*"; *banned; ++banned) {
+      if(*p == *banned) {
+        *p = '_';
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* remove trailing spaces and periods if not allowing paths */
+  if(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) && len) {
+    char *clip = NULL;
+
+    p = &target[len];
+    do {
+      --p;
+      if(*p != ' ' && *p != '.')
+        break;
+      clip = p;
+    } while(p != target);
+
+    if(clip) {
+      *clip = '\0';
+      len = clip - target;
+    }
+  }
+
+#ifdef MSDOS
+  sc = msdosify(&p, target, flags);
+  free(target);
+  if(sc)
+    return sc;
+  target = p;
+  len = strlen(target);
+
+  if(len > max_sanitized_len) {
+    free(target);
+    return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
+  }
+#endif
+
+  if(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_RESERVED)) {
+    sc = rename_if_reserved_dos_device_name(&p, target, flags);
+    free(target);
+    if(sc)
+      return sc;
+    target = p;
+    len = strlen(target);
+
+    if(len > max_sanitized_len) {
+      free(target);
+      return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
+    }
+  }
+
+  *sanitized = target;
+  return SANITIZE_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+
+/*
+Test if truncating a path to a file will leave at least a single character in
+the filename. Filenames suffixed by an alternate data stream can't be
+truncated. This performs a dry run, nothing is modified.
+
+Good truncate_pos 9:    C:\foo\bar  =>  C:\foo\ba
+Good truncate_pos 6:    C:\foo      =>  C:\foo
+Good truncate_pos 5:    C:\foo      =>  C:\fo
+Bad* truncate_pos 5:    C:foo       =>  C:foo
+Bad truncate_pos 5:     C:\foo:ads  =>  C:\fo
+Bad truncate_pos 9:     C:\foo:ads  =>  C:\foo:ad
+Bad truncate_pos 5:     C:\foo\bar  =>  C:\fo
+Bad truncate_pos 5:     C:\foo\     =>  C:\fo
+Bad truncate_pos 7:     C:\foo\     =>  C:\foo\
+Error truncate_pos 7:   C:\foo      =>  (pos out of range)
+Bad truncate_pos 1:     C:\foo\     =>  C
+
+* C:foo is ambiguous, C could end up being a drive or file therefore something
+  like C:superlongfilename can't be truncated.
+
+Returns
+SANITIZE_ERR_OK: Good -- 'path' can be truncated
+SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH: Bad -- 'path' cannot be truncated
+!= SANITIZE_ERR_OK && != SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH: Error
+*/
+SANITIZEcode truncate_dryrun(const char *path, const size_t truncate_pos)
+{
+  size_t len;
+
+  if(!path)
+    return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  len = strlen(path);
+
+  if(truncate_pos > len)
+    return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  if(!len || !truncate_pos)
+    return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
+
+  if(strpbrk(&path[truncate_pos - 1], "\\/:"))
+    return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
+
+  /* C:\foo can be truncated but C:\foo:ads can't */
+  if(truncate_pos > 1) {
+    const char *p = &path[truncate_pos - 1];
+    do {
+      --p;
+      if(*p == ':')
+        return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
+    } while(p != path && *p != '\\' && *p != '/');
+  }
+
+  return SANITIZE_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+/* The functions msdosify, rename_if_dos_device_name and __crt0_glob_function
+ * were taken with modification from the DJGPP port of tar 1.12. They use
+ * algorithms originally from DJTAR.
+ */
+
+/*
+Extra sanitization MSDOS for file_name.
+
+This is a supporting function for sanitize_file_name.
+
+Warning: This is an MSDOS legacy function and was purposely written in a way
+that some path information may pass through. For example drive letter names
+(C:, D:, etc) are allowed to pass through. For sanitizing a filename use
+sanitize_file_name.
+
+Success: (SANITIZE_ERR_OK) *sanitized points to a sanitized copy of file_name.
+Failure: (!= SANITIZE_ERR_OK) *sanitized is NULL.
+*/
+#if defined(MSDOS) || defined(UNITTESTS)
+SANITIZEcode msdosify(char **const sanitized, const char *file_name,
+                      int flags)
+{
+  char dos_name[PATH_MAX];
+  static const char illegal_chars_dos[] = ".+, ;=[]" /* illegal in DOS */
+    "|<>/\\\":?*"; /* illegal in DOS & W95 */
+  static const char *illegal_chars_w95 = &illegal_chars_dos[8];
+  int idx, dot_idx;
+  const char *s = file_name;
+  char *d = dos_name;
+  const char *const dlimit = dos_name + sizeof(dos_name) - 1;
+  const char *illegal_aliens = illegal_chars_dos;
+  size_t len = sizeof(illegal_chars_dos) - 1;
+
+  if(!sanitized)
+    return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  *sanitized = NULL;
+
+  if(!file_name)
+    return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  if(strlen(file_name) > PATH_MAX-1 &&
+     (!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) ||
+      truncate_dryrun(file_name, PATH_MAX-1)))
+    return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
+
+  /* Support for Windows 9X VFAT systems, when available. */
+  if(_use_lfn(file_name)) {
+    illegal_aliens = illegal_chars_w95;
+    len -= (illegal_chars_w95 - illegal_chars_dos);
+  }
+
+  /* Get past the drive letter, if any. */
+  if(s[0] >= 'A' && s[0] <= 'z' && s[1] == ':') {
+    *d++ = *s++;
+    *d = ((flags & (SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS|SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH))) ? ':' : '_';
+    ++d, ++s;
+  }
+
+  for(idx = 0, dot_idx = -1; *s && d < dlimit; s++, d++) {
+    if(memchr(illegal_aliens, *s, len)) {
+
+      if((flags & (SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS|SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH)) && *s == ':')
+        *d = ':';
+      else if((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) && (*s == '/' || *s == '\\'))
+        *d = *s;
+      /* Dots are special: DOS doesn't allow them as the leading character,
+         and a file name cannot have more than a single dot.  We leave the
+         first non-leading dot alone, unless it comes too close to the
+         beginning of the name: we want sh.lex.c to become sh_lex.c, not
+         sh.lex-c.  */
+      else if(*s == '.') {
+        if((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) && idx == 0 &&
+           (s[1] == '/' || s[1] == '\\' ||
+            (s[1] == '.' && (s[2] == '/' || s[2] == '\\')))) {
+          /* Copy "./" and "../" verbatim.  */
+          *d++ = *s++;
+          if(d == dlimit)
+            break;
+          if(*s == '.') {
+            *d++ = *s++;
+            if(d == dlimit)
+              break;
+          }
+          *d = *s;
+        }
+        else if(idx == 0)
+          *d = '_';
+        else if(dot_idx >= 0) {
+          if(dot_idx < 5) { /* 5 is a heuristic ad-hoc'ery */
+            d[dot_idx - idx] = '_'; /* replace previous dot */
+            *d = '.';
+          }
+          else
+            *d = '-';
+        }
+        else
+          *d = '.';
+
+        if(*s == '.')
+          dot_idx = idx;
+      }
+      else if(*s == '+' && s[1] == '+') {
+        if(idx - 2 == dot_idx) { /* .c++, .h++ etc. */
+          *d++ = 'x';
+          if(d == dlimit)
+            break;
+          *d   = 'x';
+        }
+        else {
+          /* libg++ etc.  */
+          if(dlimit - d < 4) {
+            *d++ = 'x';
+            if(d == dlimit)
+              break;
+            *d   = 'x';
+          }
+          else {
+            memcpy(d, "plus", 4);
+            d += 3;
+          }
+        }
+        s++;
+        idx++;
+      }
+      else
+        *d = '_';
+    }
+    else
+      *d = *s;
+    if(*s == '/' || *s == '\\') {
+      idx = 0;
+      dot_idx = -1;
+    }
+    else
+      idx++;
+  }
+  *d = '\0';
+
+  if(*s) {
+    /* dos_name is truncated, check that truncation requirements are met,
+       specifically truncating a filename suffixed by an alternate data stream
+       or truncating the entire filename is not allowed. */
+    if(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) || strpbrk(s, "\\/:") ||
+       truncate_dryrun(dos_name, d - dos_name))
+      return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
+  }
+
+  *sanitized = strdup(dos_name);
+  return (*sanitized ? SANITIZE_ERR_OK : SANITIZE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
+}
+#endif /* MSDOS || UNITTESTS */
+
+/*
+Rename file_name if it's a reserved dos device name.
+
+This is a supporting function for sanitize_file_name.
+
+Warning: This is an MSDOS legacy function and was purposely written in a way
+that some path information may pass through. For example drive letter names
+(C:, D:, etc) are allowed to pass through. For sanitizing a filename use
+sanitize_file_name.
+
+Success: (SANITIZE_ERR_OK) *sanitized points to a sanitized copy of file_name.
+Failure: (!= SANITIZE_ERR_OK) *sanitized is NULL.
+*/
+SANITIZEcode rename_if_reserved_dos_device_name(char **const sanitized,
+                                                const char *file_name,
+                                                int flags)
+{
+  /* We could have a file whose name is a device on MS-DOS.  Trying to
+   * retrieve such a file would fail at best and wedge us at worst.  We need
+   * to rename such files. */
+  char *p, *base;
+  char fname[PATH_MAX];
+#ifdef MSDOS
+  struct_stat st_buf;
+#endif
+
+  if(!sanitized)
+    return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  *sanitized = NULL;
+
+  if(!file_name)
+    return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
+
+  /* Ignore UNC prefixed paths, they are allowed to contain a reserved name. */
+#ifndef MSDOS
+  if((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) &&
+     file_name[0] == '\\' && file_name[1] == '\\') {
+    size_t len = strlen(file_name);
+    *sanitized = malloc(len + 1);
+    if(!*sanitized)
+      return SANITIZE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+    strncpy(*sanitized, file_name, len + 1);
+    return SANITIZE_ERR_OK;
+  }
+#endif
+
+  if(strlen(file_name) > PATH_MAX-1 &&
+     (!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) ||
+      truncate_dryrun(file_name, PATH_MAX-1)))
+    return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
+
+  strncpy(fname, file_name, PATH_MAX-1);
+  fname[PATH_MAX-1] = '\0';
+  base = basename(fname);
+
+  /* Rename reserved device names that are known to be accessible without \\.\
+     Examples: CON => _CON, CON.EXT => CON_EXT, CON:ADS => CON_ADS
+     https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/74496
+     https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa365247.aspx
+     */
+  for(p = fname; p; p = (p == fname && fname != base ? base : NULL)) {
+    size_t p_len;
+    int x = (curl_strnequal(p, "CON", 3) ||
+             curl_strnequal(p, "PRN", 3) ||
+             curl_strnequal(p, "AUX", 3) ||
+             curl_strnequal(p, "NUL", 3)) ? 3 :
+            (curl_strnequal(p, "CLOCK$", 6)) ? 6 :
+            (curl_strnequal(p, "COM", 3) || curl_strnequal(p, "LPT", 3)) ?
+              (('1' <= p[3] && p[3] <= '9') ? 4 : 3) : 0;
+
+    if(!x)
+      continue;
+
+    /* the devices may be accessible with an extension or ADS, for
+       example CON.AIR and 'CON . AIR' and CON:AIR access console */
+
+    for(; p[x] == ' '; ++x)
+      ;
+
+    if(p[x] == '.') {
+      p[x] = '_';
+      continue;
+    }
+    else if(p[x] == ':') {
+      if(!(flags & (SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS|SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH))) {
+        p[x] = '_';
+        continue;
+      }
+      ++x;
+    }
+    else if(p[x]) /* no match */
+      continue;
+
+    /* p points to 'CON' or 'CON ' or 'CON:', etc */
+    p_len = strlen(p);
+
+    /* Prepend a '_' */
+    if(strlen(fname) == PATH_MAX-1) {
+      --p_len;
+      if(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) || truncate_dryrun(p, p_len))
+        return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
+      p[p_len] = '\0';
+    }
+    memmove(p + 1, p, p_len + 1);
+    p[0] = '_';
+    ++p_len;
+
+    /* if fname was just modified then the basename pointer must be updated */
+    if(p == fname)
+      base = basename(fname);
+  }
+
+  /* This is the legacy portion from rename_if_dos_device_name that checks for
+     reserved device names. It only works on MSDOS. On Windows XP the stat
+     check errors with EINVAL if the device name is reserved. On Windows
+     Vista/7/8 it sets mode S_IFREG (regular file or device). According to MSDN
+     stat doc the latter behavior is correct, but that doesn't help us identify
+     whether it's a reserved device name and not a regular file name. */
+#ifdef MSDOS
+  if(base && ((stat(base, &st_buf)) == 0) && (S_ISCHR(st_buf.st_mode))) {
+    /* Prepend a '_' */
+    size_t blen = strlen(base);
+    if(blen) {
+      if(strlen(fname) == PATH_MAX-1) {
+        --blen;
+        if(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) || truncate_dryrun(base, blen))
+          return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
+        base[blen] = '\0';
+      }
+      memmove(base + 1, base, blen + 1);
+      base[0] = '_';
+    }
+  }
+#endif
+
+  *sanitized = strdup(fname);
+  return (*sanitized ? SANITIZE_ERR_OK : SANITIZE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
+}
+
+#if defined(MSDOS) && (defined(__DJGPP__) || defined(__GO32__))
+
+/*
+ * Disable program default argument globbing. We do it on our own.
+ */
+char **__crt0_glob_function(char *arg)
+{
+  (void)arg;
+  return (char **)0;
+}
+
+#endif /* MSDOS && (__DJGPP__ || __GO32__) */
+
+#ifdef WIN32
+
+/*
+ * Function to find CACert bundle on a Win32 platform using SearchPath.
+ * (SearchPath is already declared via inclusions done in setup header file)
+ * (Use the ASCII version instead of the unicode one!)
+ * The order of the directories it searches is:
+ *  1. application's directory
+ *  2. current working directory
+ *  3. Windows System directory (e.g. C:\windows\system32)
+ *  4. Windows Directory (e.g. C:\windows)
+ *  5. all directories along %PATH%
+ *
+ * For WinXP and later search order actually depends on registry value:
+ * HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeProcessSearchMode
+ */
+
+CURLcode FindWin32CACert(struct OperationConfig *config,
+                         curl_sslbackend backend,
+                         const char *bundle_file)
+{
+  CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+
+  /* Search and set cert file only if libcurl supports SSL.
+   *
+   * If Schannel is the selected SSL backend then these locations are
+   * ignored. We allow setting CA location for schannel only when explicitly
+   * specified by the user via CURLOPT_CAINFO / --cacert.
+   */
+  if((curlinfo->features & CURL_VERSION_SSL) &&
+     backend != CURLSSLBACKEND_SCHANNEL) {
+
+    DWORD res_len;
+    char buf[PATH_MAX];
+    char *ptr = NULL;
+
+    buf[0] = '\0';
+
+    res_len = SearchPathA(NULL, bundle_file, NULL, PATH_MAX, buf, &ptr);
+    if(res_len > 0) {
+      Curl_safefree(config->cacert);
+      config->cacert = strdup(buf);
+      if(!config->cacert)
+        result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return result;
+}
+
+
+/* Get a list of all loaded modules with full paths.
+ * Returns slist on success or NULL on error.
+ */
+struct curl_slist *GetLoadedModulePaths(void)
+{
+  HANDLE hnd = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
+  MODULEENTRY32 mod = {0};
+  struct curl_slist *slist = NULL;
+
+  mod.dwSize = sizeof(MODULEENTRY32);
+
+  do {
+    hnd = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPMODULE, 0);
+  } while(hnd == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE && GetLastError() == ERROR_BAD_LENGTH);
+
+  if(hnd == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
+    goto error;
+
+  if(!Module32First(hnd, &mod))
+    goto error;
+
+  do {
+    char *path; /* points to stack allocated buffer */
+    struct curl_slist *temp;
+
+#ifdef UNICODE
+    /* sizeof(mod.szExePath) is the max total bytes of wchars. the max total
+       bytes of multibyte chars won't be more than twice that. */
+    char buffer[sizeof(mod.szExePath) * 2];
+    if(!WideCharToMultiByte(CP_ACP, 0, mod.szExePath, -1,
+                            buffer, sizeof(buffer), NULL, NULL))
+      goto error;
+    path = buffer;
+#else
+    path = mod.szExePath;
+#endif
+    temp = curl_slist_append(slist, path);
+    if(!temp)
+      goto error;
+    slist = temp;
+  } while(Module32Next(hnd, &mod));
+
+  goto cleanup;
+
+error:
+  curl_slist_free_all(slist);
+  slist = NULL;
+cleanup:
+  if(hnd != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
+    CloseHandle(hnd);
+  return slist;
+}
+
+#endif /* WIN32 */
+
+#endif /* MSDOS || WIN32 */