--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/mupdf-source/thirdparty/curl/lib/vtls/nss.c	Mon Sep 15 11:43:07 2025 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,2448 @@
+/***************************************************************************
+ *                                  _   _ ____  _
+ *  Project                     ___| | | |  _ \| |
+ *                             / __| | | | |_) | |
+ *                            | (__| |_| |  _ <| |___
+ *                             \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2019, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ *
+ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+ * are also available at https://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
+ *
+ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
+ *
+ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
+ * KIND, either express or implied.
+ *
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Source file for all NSS-specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code
+ * but vtls.c should ever call or use these functions.
+ */
+
+#include "curl_setup.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_NSS
+
+#include "urldata.h"
+#include "sendf.h"
+#include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */
+#include "url.h" /* for the ssl config check function */
+#include "connect.h"
+#include "strcase.h"
+#include "select.h"
+#include "vtls.h"
+#include "llist.h"
+#include "multiif.h"
+#include "curl_printf.h"
+#include "nssg.h"
+#include <nspr.h>
+#include <nss.h>
+#include <ssl.h>
+#include <sslerr.h>
+#include <secerr.h>
+#include <secmod.h>
+#include <sslproto.h>
+#include <prtypes.h>
+#include <pk11pub.h>
+#include <prio.h>
+#include <secitem.h>
+#include <secport.h>
+#include <certdb.h>
+#include <base64.h>
+#include <cert.h>
+#include <prerror.h>
+#include <keyhi.h>         /* for SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey() */
+#include <private/pprio.h> /* for PR_ImportTCPSocket */
+
+#define NSSVERNUM ((NSS_VMAJOR<<16)|(NSS_VMINOR<<8)|NSS_VPATCH)
+
+#if NSSVERNUM >= 0x030f00 /* 3.15.0 */
+#include <ocsp.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "strcase.h"
+#include "warnless.h"
+#include "x509asn1.h"
+
+/* The last #include files should be: */
+#include "curl_memory.h"
+#include "memdebug.h"
+
+#define SSL_DIR "/etc/pki/nssdb"
+
+/* enough to fit the string "PEM Token #[0|1]" */
+#define SLOTSIZE 13
+
+struct ssl_backend_data {
+  PRFileDesc *handle;
+  char *client_nickname;
+  struct Curl_easy *data;
+  struct curl_llist obj_list;
+  PK11GenericObject *obj_clicert;
+};
+
+#define BACKEND connssl->backend
+
+static PRLock *nss_initlock = NULL;
+static PRLock *nss_crllock = NULL;
+static PRLock *nss_findslot_lock = NULL;
+static PRLock *nss_trustload_lock = NULL;
+static struct curl_llist nss_crl_list;
+static NSSInitContext *nss_context = NULL;
+static volatile int initialized = 0;
+
+/* type used to wrap pointers as list nodes */
+struct ptr_list_wrap {
+  void *ptr;
+  struct curl_llist_element node;
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+  const char *name;
+  int num;
+} cipher_s;
+
+#define PK11_SETATTRS(_attr, _idx, _type, _val, _len) do {  \
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE *ptr = (_attr) + ((_idx)++);                 \
+  ptr->type = (_type);                                      \
+  ptr->pValue = (_val);                                     \
+  ptr->ulValueLen = (_len);                                 \
+} WHILE_FALSE
+
+#define CERT_NewTempCertificate __CERT_NewTempCertificate
+
+#define NUM_OF_CIPHERS sizeof(cipherlist)/sizeof(cipherlist[0])
+static const cipher_s cipherlist[] = {
+  /* SSL2 cipher suites */
+  {"rc4",                        SSL_EN_RC4_128_WITH_MD5},
+  {"rc4-md5",                    SSL_EN_RC4_128_WITH_MD5},
+  {"rc4export",                  SSL_EN_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5},
+  {"rc2",                        SSL_EN_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5},
+  {"rc2export",                  SSL_EN_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5},
+  {"des",                        SSL_EN_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5},
+  {"desede3",                    SSL_EN_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5},
+  /* SSL3/TLS cipher suites */
+  {"rsa_rc4_128_md5",            SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5},
+  {"rsa_rc4_128_sha",            SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+  {"rsa_3des_sha",               SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+  {"rsa_des_sha",                SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+  {"rsa_rc4_40_md5",             SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5},
+  {"rsa_rc2_40_md5",             SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5},
+  {"rsa_null_md5",               SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5},
+  {"rsa_null_sha",               SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+  {"fips_3des_sha",              SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+  {"fips_des_sha",               SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+  {"fortezza",                   SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA},
+  {"fortezza_rc4_128_sha",       SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+  {"fortezza_null",              SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+  /* TLS 1.0: Exportable 56-bit Cipher Suites. */
+  {"rsa_des_56_sha",             TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA},
+  {"rsa_rc4_56_sha",             TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA},
+  /* AES ciphers. */
+  {"dhe_dss_aes_128_cbc_sha",    TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+  {"dhe_dss_aes_256_cbc_sha",    TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+  {"dhe_rsa_aes_128_cbc_sha",    TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+  {"dhe_rsa_aes_256_cbc_sha",    TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+  {"rsa_aes_128_sha",            TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+  {"rsa_aes_256_sha",            TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+  /* ECC ciphers. */
+  {"ecdh_ecdsa_null_sha",        TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_ecdsa_rc4_128_sha",     TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_ecdsa_3des_sha",        TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_ecdsa_aes_128_sha",     TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_ecdsa_aes_256_sha",     TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_ecdsa_null_sha",       TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_ecdsa_rc4_128_sha",    TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_ecdsa_3des_sha",       TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_sha",    TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_sha",    TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_rsa_null_sha",          TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_rsa_128_sha",           TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_rsa_3des_sha",          TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_rsa_aes_128_sha",       TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_rsa_aes_256_sha",       TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_rsa_null",             TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_rsa_rc4_128_sha",      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_rsa_3des_sha",         TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_sha",      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdhe_rsa_aes_256_sha",      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_anon_null_sha",         TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_anon_rc4_128sha",       TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_anon_3des_sha",         TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_anon_aes_128_sha",      TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
+  {"ecdh_anon_aes_256_sha",      TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+#ifdef TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256
+  /* new HMAC-SHA256 cipher suites specified in RFC */
+  {"rsa_null_sha_256",                TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256},
+  {"rsa_aes_128_cbc_sha_256",         TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+  {"rsa_aes_256_cbc_sha_256",         TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+  {"dhe_rsa_aes_128_cbc_sha_256",     TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+  {"dhe_rsa_aes_256_cbc_sha_256",     TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256},
+  {"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_cbc_sha_256", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+  {"ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_cbc_sha_256",   TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+  /* AES GCM cipher suites in RFC 5288 and RFC 5289 */
+  {"rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256",         TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+  {"dhe_rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256",     TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+  {"dhe_dss_aes_128_gcm_sha_256",     TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+  {"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+  {"ecdh_ecdsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256",  TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+  {"ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256",   TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+  {"ecdh_rsa_aes_128_gcm_sha_256",    TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+  /* cipher suites using SHA384 */
+  {"rsa_aes_256_gcm_sha_384",         TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+  {"dhe_rsa_aes_256_gcm_sha_384",     TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+  {"dhe_dss_aes_256_gcm_sha_384",     TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+  {"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_sha_384",     TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384},
+  {"ecdhe_rsa_aes_256_sha_384",       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384},
+  {"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_gcm_sha_384", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+  {"ecdhe_rsa_aes_256_gcm_sha_384",   TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+  /* chacha20-poly1305 cipher suites */
+ {"ecdhe_rsa_chacha20_poly1305_sha_256",
+     TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {"ecdhe_ecdsa_chacha20_poly1305_sha_256",
+     TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+ {"dhe_rsa_chacha20_poly1305_sha_256",
+     TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ {"aes_128_gcm_sha_256",              TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256},
+ {"aes_256_gcm_sha_384",              TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384},
+ {"chacha20_poly1305_sha_256",        TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256},
+#endif
+};
+
+#if defined(WIN32)
+static const char *pem_library = "nsspem.dll";
+static const char *trust_library = "nssckbi.dll";
+#elif defined(__APPLE__)
+static const char *pem_library = "libnsspem.dylib";
+static const char *trust_library = "libnssckbi.dylib";
+#else
+static const char *pem_library = "libnsspem.so";
+static const char *trust_library = "libnssckbi.so";
+#endif
+
+static SECMODModule *pem_module = NULL;
+static SECMODModule *trust_module = NULL;
+
+/* NSPR I/O layer we use to detect blocking direction during SSL handshake */
+static PRDescIdentity nspr_io_identity = PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER;
+static PRIOMethods nspr_io_methods;
+
+static const char *nss_error_to_name(PRErrorCode code)
+{
+  const char *name = PR_ErrorToName(code);
+  if(name)
+    return name;
+
+  return "unknown error";
+}
+
+static void nss_print_error_message(struct Curl_easy *data, PRUint32 err)
+{
+  failf(data, "%s", PR_ErrorToString(err, PR_LANGUAGE_I_DEFAULT));
+}
+
+static char *nss_sslver_to_name(PRUint16 nssver)
+{
+  switch(nssver) {
+  case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2:
+    return strdup("SSLv2");
+  case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0:
+    return strdup("SSLv3");
+  case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0:
+    return strdup("TLSv1.0");
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+  case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+    return strdup("TLSv1.1");
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+  case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+    return strdup("TLSv1.2");
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+  case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3:
+    return strdup("TLSv1.3");
+#endif
+  default:
+    return curl_maprintf("0x%04x", nssver);
+  }
+}
+
+static SECStatus set_ciphers(struct Curl_easy *data, PRFileDesc * model,
+                             char *cipher_list)
+{
+  unsigned int i;
+  PRBool cipher_state[NUM_OF_CIPHERS];
+  PRBool found;
+  char *cipher;
+
+  /* use accessors to avoid dynamic linking issues after an update of NSS */
+  const PRUint16 num_implemented_ciphers = SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers();
+  const PRUint16 *implemented_ciphers = SSL_GetImplementedCiphers();
+  if(!implemented_ciphers)
+    return SECFailure;
+
+  /* First disable all ciphers. This uses a different max value in case
+   * NSS adds more ciphers later we don't want them available by
+   * accident
+   */
+  for(i = 0; i < num_implemented_ciphers; i++) {
+    SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, implemented_ciphers[i], PR_FALSE);
+  }
+
+  /* Set every entry in our list to false */
+  for(i = 0; i < NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
+    cipher_state[i] = PR_FALSE;
+  }
+
+  cipher = cipher_list;
+
+  while(cipher_list && (cipher_list[0])) {
+    while((*cipher) && (ISSPACE(*cipher)))
+      ++cipher;
+
+    cipher_list = strchr(cipher, ',');
+    if(cipher_list) {
+      *cipher_list++ = '\0';
+    }
+
+    found = PR_FALSE;
+
+    for(i = 0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
+      if(strcasecompare(cipher, cipherlist[i].name)) {
+        cipher_state[i] = PR_TRUE;
+        found = PR_TRUE;
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if(found == PR_FALSE) {
+      failf(data, "Unknown cipher in list: %s", cipher);
+      return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if(cipher_list) {
+      cipher = cipher_list;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Finally actually enable the selected ciphers */
+  for(i = 0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
+    if(!cipher_state[i])
+      continue;
+
+    if(SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, cipherlist[i].num, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess) {
+      failf(data, "cipher-suite not supported by NSS: %s", cipherlist[i].name);
+      return SECFailure;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return true if at least one cipher-suite is enabled. Used to determine
+ * if we need to call NSS_SetDomesticPolicy() to enable the default ciphers.
+ */
+static bool any_cipher_enabled(void)
+{
+  unsigned int i;
+
+  for(i = 0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) {
+    PRInt32 policy = 0;
+    SSL_CipherPolicyGet(cipherlist[i].num, &policy);
+    if(policy)
+      return TRUE;
+  }
+
+  return FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether the nickname passed in is a filename that needs to
+ * be loaded as a PEM or a regular NSS nickname.
+ *
+ * returns 1 for a file
+ * returns 0 for not a file (NSS nickname)
+ */
+static int is_file(const char *filename)
+{
+  struct_stat st;
+
+  if(filename == NULL)
+    return 0;
+
+  if(stat(filename, &st) == 0)
+    if(S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || S_ISFIFO(st.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(st.st_mode))
+      return 1;
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check if the given string is filename or nickname of a certificate.  If the
+ * given string is recognized as filename, return NULL.  If the given string is
+ * recognized as nickname, return a duplicated string.  The returned string
+ * should be later deallocated using free().  If the OOM failure occurs, we
+ * return NULL, too.
+ */
+static char *dup_nickname(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *str)
+{
+  const char *n;
+
+  if(!is_file(str))
+    /* no such file exists, use the string as nickname */
+    return strdup(str);
+
+  /* search the first slash; we require at least one slash in a file name */
+  n = strchr(str, '/');
+  if(!n) {
+    infof(data, "warning: certificate file name \"%s\" handled as nickname; "
+          "please use \"./%s\" to force file name\n", str, str);
+    return strdup(str);
+  }
+
+  /* we'll use the PEM reader to read the certificate from file */
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Lock/unlock wrapper for PK11_FindSlotByName() to work around race condition
+ * in nssSlot_IsTokenPresent() causing spurious SEC_ERROR_NO_TOKEN.  For more
+ * details, go to <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/1297397>.
+ */
+static PK11SlotInfo* nss_find_slot_by_name(const char *slot_name)
+{
+  PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+  PR_Lock(nss_findslot_lock);
+  slot = PK11_FindSlotByName(slot_name);
+  PR_Unlock(nss_findslot_lock);
+  return slot;
+}
+
+/* wrap 'ptr' as list node and tail-insert into 'list' */
+static CURLcode insert_wrapped_ptr(struct curl_llist *list, void *ptr)
+{
+  struct ptr_list_wrap *wrap = malloc(sizeof(*wrap));
+  if(!wrap)
+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+  wrap->ptr = ptr;
+  Curl_llist_insert_next(list, list->tail, wrap, &wrap->node);
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+/* Call PK11_CreateGenericObject() with the given obj_class and filename.  If
+ * the call succeeds, append the object handle to the list of objects so that
+ * the object can be destroyed in Curl_nss_close(). */
+static CURLcode nss_create_object(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
+                                  CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_class,
+                                  const char *filename, bool cacert)
+{
+  PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+  PK11GenericObject *obj;
+  CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+  CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[/* max count of attributes */ 4];
+  int attr_cnt = 0;
+  CURLcode result = (cacert)
+    ? CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE
+    : CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+
+  const int slot_id = (cacert) ? 0 : 1;
+  char *slot_name = aprintf("PEM Token #%d", slot_id);
+  if(!slot_name)
+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+  slot = nss_find_slot_by_name(slot_name);
+  free(slot_name);
+  if(!slot)
+    return result;
+
+  PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_CLASS, &obj_class, sizeof(obj_class));
+  PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+  PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_LABEL, (unsigned char *)filename,
+                (CK_ULONG)strlen(filename) + 1);
+
+  if(CKO_CERTIFICATE == obj_class) {
+    CK_BBOOL *pval = (cacert) ? (&cktrue) : (&ckfalse);
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, attr_cnt, CKA_TRUST, pval, sizeof(*pval));
+  }
+
+  /* PK11_CreateManagedGenericObject() was introduced in NSS 3.34 because
+   * PK11_DestroyGenericObject() does not release resources allocated by
+   * PK11_CreateGenericObject() early enough.  */
+  obj =
+#ifdef HAVE_PK11_CREATEMANAGEDGENERICOBJECT
+    PK11_CreateManagedGenericObject
+#else
+    PK11_CreateGenericObject
+#endif
+    (slot, attrs, attr_cnt, PR_FALSE);
+
+  PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+  if(!obj)
+    return result;
+
+  if(insert_wrapped_ptr(&BACKEND->obj_list, obj) != CURLE_OK) {
+    PK11_DestroyGenericObject(obj);
+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+  }
+
+  if(!cacert && CKO_CERTIFICATE == obj_class)
+    /* store reference to a client certificate */
+    BACKEND->obj_clicert = obj;
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+/* Destroy the NSS object whose handle is given by ptr.  This function is
+ * a callback of Curl_llist_alloc() used by Curl_llist_destroy() to destroy
+ * NSS objects in Curl_nss_close() */
+static void nss_destroy_object(void *user, void *ptr)
+{
+  struct ptr_list_wrap *wrap = (struct ptr_list_wrap *) ptr;
+  PK11GenericObject *obj = (PK11GenericObject *) wrap->ptr;
+  (void) user;
+  PK11_DestroyGenericObject(obj);
+  free(wrap);
+}
+
+/* same as nss_destroy_object() but for CRL items */
+static void nss_destroy_crl_item(void *user, void *ptr)
+{
+  struct ptr_list_wrap *wrap = (struct ptr_list_wrap *) ptr;
+  SECItem *crl_der = (SECItem *) wrap->ptr;
+  (void) user;
+  SECITEM_FreeItem(crl_der, PR_TRUE);
+  free(wrap);
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_load_cert(struct ssl_connect_data *ssl,
+                              const char *filename, PRBool cacert)
+{
+  CURLcode result = (cacert)
+    ? CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE
+    : CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+
+  /* libnsspem.so leaks memory if the requested file does not exist.  For more
+   * details, go to <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/734760>. */
+  if(is_file(filename))
+    result = nss_create_object(ssl, CKO_CERTIFICATE, filename, cacert);
+
+  if(!result && !cacert) {
+    /* we have successfully loaded a client certificate */
+    CERTCertificate *cert;
+    char *nickname = NULL;
+    char *n = strrchr(filename, '/');
+    if(n)
+      n++;
+
+    /* The following undocumented magic helps to avoid a SIGSEGV on call
+     * of PK11_ReadRawAttribute() from SelectClientCert() when using an
+     * immature version of libnsspem.so.  For more details, go to
+     * <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/733685>. */
+    nickname = aprintf("PEM Token #1:%s", n);
+    if(nickname) {
+      cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(nickname, NULL);
+      if(cert)
+        CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+
+      free(nickname);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return result;
+}
+
+/* add given CRL to cache if it is not already there */
+static CURLcode nss_cache_crl(SECItem *crl_der)
+{
+  CERTCertDBHandle *db = CERT_GetDefaultCertDB();
+  CERTSignedCrl *crl = SEC_FindCrlByDERCert(db, crl_der, 0);
+  if(crl) {
+    /* CRL already cached */
+    SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
+    SECITEM_FreeItem(crl_der, PR_TRUE);
+    return CURLE_OK;
+  }
+
+  /* acquire lock before call of CERT_CacheCRL() and accessing nss_crl_list */
+  PR_Lock(nss_crllock);
+
+  if(SECSuccess != CERT_CacheCRL(db, crl_der)) {
+    /* unable to cache CRL */
+    SECITEM_FreeItem(crl_der, PR_TRUE);
+    PR_Unlock(nss_crllock);
+    return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
+  }
+
+  /* store the CRL item so that we can free it in Curl_nss_cleanup() */
+  if(insert_wrapped_ptr(&nss_crl_list, crl_der) != CURLE_OK) {
+    if(SECSuccess == CERT_UncacheCRL(db, crl_der))
+      SECITEM_FreeItem(crl_der, PR_TRUE);
+    PR_Unlock(nss_crllock);
+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+  }
+
+  /* we need to clear session cache, so that the CRL could take effect */
+  SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+  PR_Unlock(nss_crllock);
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_load_crl(const char *crlfilename)
+{
+  PRFileDesc *infile;
+  PRFileInfo  info;
+  SECItem filedata = { 0, NULL, 0 };
+  SECItem *crl_der = NULL;
+  char *body;
+
+  infile = PR_Open(crlfilename, PR_RDONLY, 0);
+  if(!infile)
+    return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
+
+  if(PR_SUCCESS != PR_GetOpenFileInfo(infile, &info))
+    goto fail;
+
+  if(!SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &filedata, info.size + /* zero ended */ 1))
+    goto fail;
+
+  if(info.size != PR_Read(infile, filedata.data, info.size))
+    goto fail;
+
+  crl_der = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, NULL, 0U);
+  if(!crl_der)
+    goto fail;
+
+  /* place a trailing zero right after the visible data */
+  body = (char *)filedata.data;
+  body[--filedata.len] = '\0';
+
+  body = strstr(body, "-----BEGIN");
+  if(body) {
+    /* assume ASCII */
+    char *trailer;
+    char *begin = PORT_Strchr(body, '\n');
+    if(!begin)
+      begin = PORT_Strchr(body, '\r');
+    if(!begin)
+      goto fail;
+
+    trailer = strstr(++begin, "-----END");
+    if(!trailer)
+      goto fail;
+
+    /* retrieve DER from ASCII */
+    *trailer = '\0';
+    if(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(crl_der, begin))
+      goto fail;
+
+    SECITEM_FreeItem(&filedata, PR_FALSE);
+  }
+  else
+    /* assume DER */
+    *crl_der = filedata;
+
+  PR_Close(infile);
+  return nss_cache_crl(crl_der);
+
+fail:
+  PR_Close(infile);
+  SECITEM_FreeItem(crl_der, PR_TRUE);
+  SECITEM_FreeItem(&filedata, PR_FALSE);
+  return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_load_key(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex,
+                             char *key_file)
+{
+  PK11SlotInfo *slot, *tmp;
+  SECStatus status;
+  CURLcode result;
+  struct ssl_connect_data *ssl = conn->ssl;
+  struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+
+  (void)sockindex; /* unused */
+
+  result = nss_create_object(ssl, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, key_file, FALSE);
+  if(result) {
+    PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY, 0);
+    return result;
+  }
+
+  slot = nss_find_slot_by_name("PEM Token #1");
+  if(!slot)
+    return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+
+  /* This will force the token to be seen as re-inserted */
+  tmp = SECMOD_WaitForAnyTokenEvent(pem_module, 0, 0);
+  if(tmp)
+    PK11_FreeSlot(tmp);
+  if(!PK11_IsPresent(slot)) {
+    PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+    return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+  }
+
+  status = PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE, SSL_SET_OPTION(key_passwd));
+  PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+  return (SECSuccess == status) ? CURLE_OK : CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+}
+
+static int display_error(struct connectdata *conn, PRInt32 err,
+                         const char *filename)
+{
+  switch(err) {
+  case SEC_ERROR_BAD_PASSWORD:
+    failf(conn->data, "Unable to load client key: Incorrect password");
+    return 1;
+  case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CERT:
+    failf(conn->data, "Unable to load certificate %s", filename);
+    return 1;
+  default:
+    break;
+  }
+  return 0; /* The caller will print a generic error */
+}
+
+static CURLcode cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex,
+                           char *cert_file, char *key_file)
+{
+  struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+  CURLcode result;
+
+  if(cert_file) {
+    result = nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], cert_file, PR_FALSE);
+    if(result) {
+      const PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError();
+      if(!display_error(conn, err, cert_file)) {
+        const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err);
+        failf(data, "unable to load client cert: %d (%s)", err, err_name);
+      }
+
+      return result;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if(key_file || (is_file(cert_file))) {
+    if(key_file)
+      result = nss_load_key(conn, sockindex, key_file);
+    else
+      /* In case the cert file also has the key */
+      result = nss_load_key(conn, sockindex, cert_file);
+    if(result) {
+      const PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError();
+      if(!display_error(conn, err, key_file)) {
+        const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err);
+        failf(data, "unable to load client key: %d (%s)", err, err_name);
+      }
+
+      return result;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static char *nss_get_password(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg)
+{
+  (void)slot; /* unused */
+
+  if(retry || NULL == arg)
+    return NULL;
+  else
+    return (char *)PORT_Strdup((char *)arg);
+}
+
+/* bypass the default SSL_AuthCertificate() hook in case we do not want to
+ * verify peer */
+static SECStatus nss_auth_cert_hook(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checksig,
+                                    PRBool isServer)
+{
+  struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata *)arg;
+
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING
+  if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifystatus)) {
+    SECStatus cacheResult;
+
+    const SECItemArray *csa = SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses(fd);
+    if(!csa) {
+      failf(conn->data, "Invalid OCSP response");
+      return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if(csa->len == 0) {
+      failf(conn->data, "No OCSP response received");
+      return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    cacheResult = CERT_CacheOCSPResponseFromSideChannel(
+      CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), SSL_PeerCertificate(fd),
+      PR_Now(), &csa->items[0], arg
+    );
+
+    if(cacheResult != SECSuccess) {
+      failf(conn->data, "Invalid OCSP response");
+      return cacheResult;
+    }
+  }
+#endif
+
+  if(!SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) {
+    infof(conn->data, "skipping SSL peer certificate verification\n");
+    return SECSuccess;
+  }
+
+  return SSL_AuthCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), fd, checksig, isServer);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Inform the application that the handshake is complete.
+ */
+static void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *sock, void *arg)
+{
+  struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata*) arg;
+  unsigned int buflenmax = 50;
+  unsigned char buf[50];
+  unsigned int buflen;
+  SSLNextProtoState state;
+
+  if(!conn->bits.tls_enable_npn && !conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if(SSL_GetNextProto(sock, &state, buf, &buflen, buflenmax) == SECSuccess) {
+
+    switch(state) {
+#if NSSVERNUM >= 0x031a00 /* 3.26.0 */
+    /* used by NSS internally to implement 0-RTT */
+    case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_EARLY_VALUE:
+      /* fall through! */
+#endif
+    case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT:
+    case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_OVERLAP:
+      infof(conn->data, "ALPN/NPN, server did not agree to a protocol\n");
+      return;
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_ALPN
+    case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED:
+      infof(conn->data, "ALPN, server accepted to use %.*s\n", buflen, buf);
+      break;
+#endif
+    case SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED:
+      infof(conn->data, "NPN, server accepted to use %.*s\n", buflen, buf);
+      break;
+    }
+
+#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
+    if(buflen == NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN &&
+       !memcmp(NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID, buf, NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN)) {
+      conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2;
+    }
+    else
+#endif
+    if(buflen == ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH &&
+       !memcmp(ALPN_HTTP_1_1, buf, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH)) {
+      conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
+    }
+    Curl_multiuse_state(conn, conn->negnpn == CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2 ?
+                        BUNDLE_MULTIPLEX : BUNDLE_NO_MULTIUSE);
+  }
+}
+
+#if NSSVERNUM >= 0x030f04 /* 3.15.4 */
+static SECStatus CanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc *sock, void *client_data,
+                                       PRBool *canFalseStart)
+{
+  struct connectdata *conn = client_data;
+  struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+
+  SSLChannelInfo channelInfo;
+  SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo;
+
+  SECStatus rv;
+  PRBool negotiatedExtension;
+
+  *canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
+
+  if(SSL_GetChannelInfo(sock, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo)) != SECSuccess)
+    return SECFailure;
+
+  if(SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo,
+                            sizeof(cipherInfo)) != SECSuccess)
+    return SECFailure;
+
+  /* Prevent version downgrade attacks from TLS 1.2, and avoid False Start for
+   * TLS 1.3 and later. See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=861310
+   */
+  if(channelInfo.protocolVersion != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2)
+    goto end;
+
+  /* Only allow ECDHE key exchange algorithm.
+   * See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=952863 */
+  if(cipherInfo.keaType != ssl_kea_ecdh)
+    goto end;
+
+  /* Prevent downgrade attacks on the symmetric cipher. We do not allow CBC
+   * mode due to BEAST, POODLE, and other attacks on the MAC-then-Encrypt
+   * design. See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1109766 */
+  if(cipherInfo.symCipher != ssl_calg_aes_gcm)
+    goto end;
+
+  /* Enforce ALPN or NPN to do False Start, as an indicator of server
+   * compatibility. */
+  rv = SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(sock, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn,
+                                        &negotiatedExtension);
+  if(rv != SECSuccess || !negotiatedExtension) {
+    rv = SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(sock, ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn,
+                                          &negotiatedExtension);
+  }
+
+  if(rv != SECSuccess || !negotiatedExtension)
+    goto end;
+
+  *canFalseStart = PR_TRUE;
+
+  infof(data, "Trying TLS False Start\n");
+
+end:
+  return SECSuccess;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void display_cert_info(struct Curl_easy *data,
+                              CERTCertificate *cert)
+{
+  char *subject, *issuer, *common_name;
+  PRExplodedTime printableTime;
+  char timeString[256];
+  PRTime notBefore, notAfter;
+
+  subject = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->subject);
+  issuer = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->issuer);
+  common_name = CERT_GetCommonName(&cert->subject);
+  infof(data, "\tsubject: %s\n", subject);
+
+  CERT_GetCertTimes(cert, &notBefore, &notAfter);
+  PR_ExplodeTime(notBefore, PR_GMTParameters, &printableTime);
+  PR_FormatTime(timeString, 256, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y GMT", &printableTime);
+  infof(data, "\tstart date: %s\n", timeString);
+  PR_ExplodeTime(notAfter, PR_GMTParameters, &printableTime);
+  PR_FormatTime(timeString, 256, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y GMT", &printableTime);
+  infof(data, "\texpire date: %s\n", timeString);
+  infof(data, "\tcommon name: %s\n", common_name);
+  infof(data, "\tissuer: %s\n", issuer);
+
+  PR_Free(subject);
+  PR_Free(issuer);
+  PR_Free(common_name);
+}
+
+static CURLcode display_conn_info(struct connectdata *conn, PRFileDesc *sock)
+{
+  CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+  SSLChannelInfo channel;
+  SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
+  CERTCertificate *cert;
+  CERTCertificate *cert2;
+  CERTCertificate *cert3;
+  PRTime now;
+  int i;
+
+  if(SSL_GetChannelInfo(sock, &channel, sizeof(channel)) ==
+     SECSuccess && channel.length == sizeof(channel) &&
+     channel.cipherSuite) {
+    if(SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite,
+                              &suite, sizeof(suite)) == SECSuccess) {
+      infof(conn->data, "SSL connection using %s\n", suite.cipherSuiteName);
+    }
+  }
+
+  cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock);
+  if(cert) {
+    infof(conn->data, "Server certificate:\n");
+
+    if(!conn->data->set.ssl.certinfo) {
+      display_cert_info(conn->data, cert);
+      CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+    }
+    else {
+      /* Count certificates in chain. */
+      now = PR_Now();
+      i = 1;
+      if(!cert->isRoot) {
+        cert2 = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert, now, certUsageSSLCA);
+        while(cert2) {
+          i++;
+          if(cert2->isRoot) {
+            CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert2);
+            break;
+          }
+          cert3 = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert2, now, certUsageSSLCA);
+          CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert2);
+          cert2 = cert3;
+        }
+      }
+
+      result = Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(conn->data, i);
+      if(!result) {
+        for(i = 0; cert; cert = cert2) {
+          result = Curl_extract_certinfo(conn, i++, (char *)cert->derCert.data,
+                                         (char *)cert->derCert.data +
+                                                 cert->derCert.len);
+          if(result)
+            break;
+
+          if(cert->isRoot) {
+            CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+            break;
+          }
+
+          cert2 = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert, now, certUsageSSLCA);
+          CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return result;
+}
+
+static SECStatus BadCertHandler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *sock)
+{
+  struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata *)arg;
+  struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+  PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError();
+  CERTCertificate *cert;
+
+  /* remember the cert verification result */
+  if(SSL_IS_PROXY())
+    data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult = err;
+  else
+    data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = err;
+
+  if(err == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN && !SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost))
+    /* we are asked not to verify the host name */
+    return SECSuccess;
+
+  /* print only info about the cert, the error is printed off the callback */
+  cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock);
+  if(cert) {
+    infof(data, "Server certificate:\n");
+    display_cert_info(data, cert);
+    CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+  }
+
+  return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/**
+ *
+ * Check that the Peer certificate's issuer certificate matches the one found
+ * by issuer_nickname.  This is not exactly the way OpenSSL and GNU TLS do the
+ * issuer check, so we provide comments that mimic the OpenSSL
+ * X509_check_issued function (in x509v3/v3_purp.c)
+ */
+static SECStatus check_issuer_cert(PRFileDesc *sock,
+                                   char *issuer_nickname)
+{
+  CERTCertificate *cert, *cert_issuer, *issuer;
+  SECStatus res = SECSuccess;
+  void *proto_win = NULL;
+
+  cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock);
+  cert_issuer = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert, PR_Now(), certUsageObjectSigner);
+
+  proto_win = SSL_RevealPinArg(sock);
+  issuer = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(issuer_nickname, proto_win);
+
+  if((!cert_issuer) || (!issuer))
+    res = SECFailure;
+  else if(SECITEM_CompareItem(&cert_issuer->derCert,
+                              &issuer->derCert) != SECEqual)
+    res = SECFailure;
+
+  CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+  CERT_DestroyCertificate(issuer);
+  CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert_issuer);
+  return res;
+}
+
+static CURLcode cmp_peer_pubkey(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
+                                const char *pinnedpubkey)
+{
+  CURLcode result = CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
+  struct Curl_easy *data = BACKEND->data;
+  CERTCertificate *cert;
+
+  if(!pinnedpubkey)
+    /* no pinned public key specified */
+    return CURLE_OK;
+
+  /* get peer certificate */
+  cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(BACKEND->handle);
+  if(cert) {
+    /* extract public key from peer certificate */
+    SECKEYPublicKey *pubkey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
+    if(pubkey) {
+      /* encode the public key as DER */
+      SECItem *cert_der = PK11_DEREncodePublicKey(pubkey);
+      if(cert_der) {
+        /* compare the public key with the pinned public key */
+        result = Curl_pin_peer_pubkey(data, pinnedpubkey, cert_der->data,
+                                      cert_der->len);
+        SECITEM_FreeItem(cert_der, PR_TRUE);
+      }
+      SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubkey);
+    }
+    CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+  }
+
+  /* report the resulting status */
+  switch(result) {
+  case CURLE_OK:
+    infof(data, "pinned public key verified successfully!\n");
+    break;
+  case CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH:
+    failf(data, "failed to verify pinned public key");
+    break;
+  default:
+    /* OOM, etc. */
+    break;
+  }
+
+  return result;
+}
+
+/**
+ *
+ * Callback to pick the SSL client certificate.
+ */
+static SECStatus SelectClientCert(void *arg, PRFileDesc *sock,
+                                  struct CERTDistNamesStr *caNames,
+                                  struct CERTCertificateStr **pRetCert,
+                                  struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr **pRetKey)
+{
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = (struct ssl_connect_data *)arg;
+  struct Curl_easy *data = BACKEND->data;
+  const char *nickname = BACKEND->client_nickname;
+  static const char pem_slotname[] = "PEM Token #1";
+
+  if(BACKEND->obj_clicert) {
+    /* use the cert/key provided by PEM reader */
+    SECItem cert_der = { 0, NULL, 0 };
+    void *proto_win = SSL_RevealPinArg(sock);
+    struct CERTCertificateStr *cert;
+    struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr *key;
+
+    PK11SlotInfo *slot = nss_find_slot_by_name(pem_slotname);
+    if(NULL == slot) {
+      failf(data, "NSS: PK11 slot not found: %s", pem_slotname);
+      return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if(PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypeGeneric, BACKEND->obj_clicert, CKA_VALUE,
+                             &cert_der) != SECSuccess) {
+      failf(data, "NSS: CKA_VALUE not found in PK11 generic object");
+      PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+      return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    cert = PK11_FindCertFromDERCertItem(slot, &cert_der, proto_win);
+    SECITEM_FreeItem(&cert_der, PR_FALSE);
+    if(NULL == cert) {
+      failf(data, "NSS: client certificate from file not found");
+      PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+      return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    key = PK11_FindPrivateKeyFromCert(slot, cert, NULL);
+    PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+    if(NULL == key) {
+      failf(data, "NSS: private key from file not found");
+      CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+      return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    infof(data, "NSS: client certificate from file\n");
+    display_cert_info(data, cert);
+
+    *pRetCert = cert;
+    *pRetKey = key;
+    return SECSuccess;
+  }
+
+  /* use the default NSS hook */
+  if(SECSuccess != NSS_GetClientAuthData((void *)nickname, sock, caNames,
+                                          pRetCert, pRetKey)
+      || NULL == *pRetCert) {
+
+    if(NULL == nickname)
+      failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found (nickname not "
+            "specified)");
+    else
+      failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found: %s", nickname);
+
+    return SECFailure;
+  }
+
+  /* get certificate nickname if any */
+  nickname = (*pRetCert)->nickname;
+  if(NULL == nickname)
+    nickname = "[unknown]";
+
+  if(!strncmp(nickname, pem_slotname, sizeof(pem_slotname) - 1U)) {
+    failf(data, "NSS: refusing previously loaded certificate from file: %s",
+          nickname);
+    return SECFailure;
+  }
+
+  if(NULL == *pRetKey) {
+    failf(data, "NSS: private key not found for certificate: %s", nickname);
+    return SECFailure;
+  }
+
+  infof(data, "NSS: using client certificate: %s\n", nickname);
+  display_cert_info(data, *pRetCert);
+  return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* update blocking direction in case of PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR */
+static void nss_update_connecting_state(ssl_connect_state state, void *secret)
+{
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = (struct ssl_connect_data *)secret;
+  if(PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+    /* an unrelated error is passing by */
+    return;
+
+  switch(connssl->connecting_state) {
+  case ssl_connect_2:
+  case ssl_connect_2_reading:
+  case ssl_connect_2_writing:
+    break;
+  default:
+    /* we are not called from an SSL handshake */
+    return;
+  }
+
+  /* update the state accordingly */
+  connssl->connecting_state = state;
+}
+
+/* recv() wrapper we use to detect blocking direction during SSL handshake */
+static PRInt32 nspr_io_recv(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+                            PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+  const PRRecvFN recv_fn = fd->lower->methods->recv;
+  const PRInt32 rv = recv_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+  if(rv < 0)
+    /* check for PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR and update blocking direction */
+    nss_update_connecting_state(ssl_connect_2_reading, fd->secret);
+  return rv;
+}
+
+/* send() wrapper we use to detect blocking direction during SSL handshake */
+static PRInt32 nspr_io_send(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount,
+                            PRIntn flags, PRIntervalTime timeout)
+{
+  const PRSendFN send_fn = fd->lower->methods->send;
+  const PRInt32 rv = send_fn(fd->lower, buf, amount, flags, timeout);
+  if(rv < 0)
+    /* check for PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR and update blocking direction */
+    nss_update_connecting_state(ssl_connect_2_writing, fd->secret);
+  return rv;
+}
+
+/* close() wrapper to avoid assertion failure due to fd->secret != NULL */
+static PRStatus nspr_io_close(PRFileDesc *fd)
+{
+  const PRCloseFN close_fn = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close;
+  fd->secret = NULL;
+  return close_fn(fd);
+}
+
+/* load a PKCS #11 module */
+static CURLcode nss_load_module(SECMODModule **pmod, const char *library,
+                                const char *name)
+{
+  char *config_string;
+  SECMODModule *module = *pmod;
+  if(module)
+    /* already loaded */
+    return CURLE_OK;
+
+  config_string = aprintf("library=%s name=%s", library, name);
+  if(!config_string)
+    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+  module = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(config_string, NULL, PR_FALSE);
+  free(config_string);
+
+  if(module && module->loaded) {
+    /* loaded successfully */
+    *pmod = module;
+    return CURLE_OK;
+  }
+
+  if(module)
+    SECMOD_DestroyModule(module);
+  return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
+}
+
+/* unload a PKCS #11 module */
+static void nss_unload_module(SECMODModule **pmod)
+{
+  SECMODModule *module = *pmod;
+  if(!module)
+    /* not loaded */
+    return;
+
+  if(SECMOD_UnloadUserModule(module) != SECSuccess)
+    /* unload failed */
+    return;
+
+  SECMOD_DestroyModule(module);
+  *pmod = NULL;
+}
+
+/* data might be NULL */
+static CURLcode nss_init_core(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *cert_dir)
+{
+  NSSInitParameters initparams;
+  PRErrorCode err;
+  const char *err_name;
+
+  if(nss_context != NULL)
+    return CURLE_OK;
+
+  memset((void *) &initparams, '\0', sizeof(initparams));
+  initparams.length = sizeof(initparams);
+
+  if(cert_dir) {
+    char *certpath = aprintf("sql:%s", cert_dir);
+    if(!certpath)
+      return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+    infof(data, "Initializing NSS with certpath: %s\n", certpath);
+    nss_context = NSS_InitContext(certpath, "", "", "", &initparams,
+            NSS_INIT_READONLY | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+    free(certpath);
+
+    if(nss_context != NULL)
+      return CURLE_OK;
+
+    err = PR_GetError();
+    err_name = nss_error_to_name(err);
+    infof(data, "Unable to initialize NSS database: %d (%s)\n", err, err_name);
+  }
+
+  infof(data, "Initializing NSS with certpath: none\n");
+  nss_context = NSS_InitContext("", "", "", "", &initparams, NSS_INIT_READONLY
+         | NSS_INIT_NOCERTDB   | NSS_INIT_NOMODDB       | NSS_INIT_FORCEOPEN
+         | NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_OPTIMIZESPACE | NSS_INIT_PK11RELOAD);
+  if(nss_context != NULL)
+    return CURLE_OK;
+
+  err = PR_GetError();
+  err_name = nss_error_to_name(err);
+  failf(data, "Unable to initialize NSS: %d (%s)", err, err_name);
+  return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+}
+
+/* data might be NULL */
+static CURLcode nss_init(struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+  char *cert_dir;
+  struct_stat st;
+  CURLcode result;
+
+  if(initialized)
+    return CURLE_OK;
+
+  /* list of all CRL items we need to destroy in Curl_nss_cleanup() */
+  Curl_llist_init(&nss_crl_list, nss_destroy_crl_item);
+
+  /* First we check if $SSL_DIR points to a valid dir */
+  cert_dir = getenv("SSL_DIR");
+  if(cert_dir) {
+    if((stat(cert_dir, &st) != 0) ||
+        (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))) {
+      cert_dir = NULL;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Now we check if the default location is a valid dir */
+  if(!cert_dir) {
+    if((stat(SSL_DIR, &st) == 0) &&
+        (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))) {
+      cert_dir = (char *)SSL_DIR;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if(nspr_io_identity == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER) {
+    /* allocate an identity for our own NSPR I/O layer */
+    nspr_io_identity = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("libcurl");
+    if(nspr_io_identity == PR_INVALID_IO_LAYER)
+      return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+
+    /* the default methods just call down to the lower I/O layer */
+    memcpy(&nspr_io_methods, PR_GetDefaultIOMethods(),
+           sizeof(nspr_io_methods));
+
+    /* override certain methods in the table by our wrappers */
+    nspr_io_methods.recv  = nspr_io_recv;
+    nspr_io_methods.send  = nspr_io_send;
+    nspr_io_methods.close = nspr_io_close;
+  }
+
+  result = nss_init_core(data, cert_dir);
+  if(result)
+    return result;
+
+  if(!any_cipher_enabled())
+    NSS_SetDomesticPolicy();
+
+  initialized = 1;
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Global SSL init
+ *
+ * @retval 0 error initializing SSL
+ * @retval 1 SSL initialized successfully
+ */
+static int Curl_nss_init(void)
+{
+  /* curl_global_init() is not thread-safe so this test is ok */
+  if(nss_initlock == NULL) {
+    PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 0);
+    nss_initlock = PR_NewLock();
+    nss_crllock = PR_NewLock();
+    nss_findslot_lock = PR_NewLock();
+    nss_trustload_lock = PR_NewLock();
+  }
+
+  /* We will actually initialize NSS later */
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/* data might be NULL */
+CURLcode Curl_nss_force_init(struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+  CURLcode result;
+  if(!nss_initlock) {
+    if(data)
+      failf(data, "unable to initialize NSS, curl_global_init() should have "
+                  "been called with CURL_GLOBAL_SSL or CURL_GLOBAL_ALL");
+    return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
+  }
+
+  PR_Lock(nss_initlock);
+  result = nss_init(data);
+  PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
+
+  return result;
+}
+
+/* Global cleanup */
+static void Curl_nss_cleanup(void)
+{
+  /* This function isn't required to be threadsafe and this is only done
+   * as a safety feature.
+   */
+  PR_Lock(nss_initlock);
+  if(initialized) {
+    /* Free references to client certificates held in the SSL session cache.
+     * Omitting this hampers destruction of the security module owning
+     * the certificates. */
+    SSL_ClearSessionCache();
+
+    nss_unload_module(&pem_module);
+    nss_unload_module(&trust_module);
+    NSS_ShutdownContext(nss_context);
+    nss_context = NULL;
+  }
+
+  /* destroy all CRL items */
+  Curl_llist_destroy(&nss_crl_list, NULL);
+
+  PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
+
+  PR_DestroyLock(nss_initlock);
+  PR_DestroyLock(nss_crllock);
+  PR_DestroyLock(nss_findslot_lock);
+  PR_DestroyLock(nss_trustload_lock);
+  nss_initlock = NULL;
+
+  initialized = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function uses SSL_peek to determine connection status.
+ *
+ * Return codes:
+ *     1 means the connection is still in place
+ *     0 means the connection has been closed
+ *    -1 means the connection status is unknown
+ */
+static int Curl_nss_check_cxn(struct connectdata *conn)
+{
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[FIRSTSOCKET];
+  int rc;
+  char buf;
+
+  rc =
+    PR_Recv(BACKEND->handle, (void *)&buf, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK,
+            PR_SecondsToInterval(1));
+  if(rc > 0)
+    return 1; /* connection still in place */
+
+  if(rc == 0)
+    return 0; /* connection has been closed */
+
+  return -1;  /* connection status unknown */
+}
+
+static void nss_close(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl)
+{
+  /* before the cleanup, check whether we are using a client certificate */
+  const bool client_cert = (BACKEND->client_nickname != NULL)
+    || (BACKEND->obj_clicert != NULL);
+
+  free(BACKEND->client_nickname);
+  BACKEND->client_nickname = NULL;
+
+  /* destroy all NSS objects in order to avoid failure of NSS shutdown */
+  Curl_llist_destroy(&BACKEND->obj_list, NULL);
+  BACKEND->obj_clicert = NULL;
+
+  if(BACKEND->handle) {
+    if(client_cert)
+      /* A server might require different authentication based on the
+       * particular path being requested by the client.  To support this
+       * scenario, we must ensure that a connection will never reuse the
+       * authentication data from a previous connection. */
+      SSL_InvalidateSession(BACKEND->handle);
+
+    PR_Close(BACKEND->handle);
+    BACKEND->handle = NULL;
+  }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is called when an SSL connection is closed.
+ */
+static void Curl_nss_close(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl_proxy = &conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex];
+
+  if(BACKEND->handle || connssl_proxy->backend->handle) {
+    /* NSS closes the socket we previously handed to it, so we must mark it
+       as closed to avoid double close */
+    fake_sclose(conn->sock[sockindex]);
+    conn->sock[sockindex] = CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
+  }
+
+  if(BACKEND->handle)
+    /* nss_close(connssl) will transitively close also
+       connssl_proxy->backend->handle if both are used. Clear it to avoid
+       a double close leading to crash. */
+    connssl_proxy->backend->handle = NULL;
+
+  nss_close(connssl);
+  nss_close(connssl_proxy);
+}
+
+/* return true if NSS can provide error code (and possibly msg) for the
+   error */
+static bool is_nss_error(CURLcode err)
+{
+  switch(err) {
+  case CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION:
+  case CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM:
+  case CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR:
+  case CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR:
+    return true;
+
+  default:
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+/* return true if the given error code is related to a client certificate */
+static bool is_cc_error(PRInt32 err)
+{
+  switch(err) {
+  case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT:
+  case SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT:
+  case SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT:
+    return true;
+
+  default:
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+static Curl_recv nss_recv;
+static Curl_send nss_send;
+
+static CURLcode nss_load_ca_certificates(struct connectdata *conn,
+                                         int sockindex)
+{
+  struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+  const char *cafile = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile);
+  const char *capath = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CApath);
+  bool use_trust_module;
+  CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+
+  /* treat empty string as unset */
+  if(cafile && !cafile[0])
+    cafile = NULL;
+  if(capath && !capath[0])
+    capath = NULL;
+
+  infof(data, "  CAfile: %s\n  CApath: %s\n",
+      cafile ? cafile : "none",
+      capath ? capath : "none");
+
+  /* load libnssckbi.so if no other trust roots were specified */
+  use_trust_module = !cafile && !capath;
+
+  PR_Lock(nss_trustload_lock);
+  if(use_trust_module && !trust_module) {
+    /* libnssckbi.so needed but not yet loaded --> load it! */
+    result = nss_load_module(&trust_module, trust_library, "trust");
+    infof(data, "%s %s\n", (result) ? "failed to load" : "loaded",
+          trust_library);
+    if(result == CURLE_FAILED_INIT)
+      /* If libnssckbi.so is not available (or fails to load), one can still
+         use CA certificates stored in NSS database.  Ignore the failure. */
+      result = CURLE_OK;
+  }
+  else if(!use_trust_module && trust_module) {
+    /* libnssckbi.so not needed but already loaded --> unload it! */
+    infof(data, "unloading %s\n", trust_library);
+    nss_unload_module(&trust_module);
+  }
+  PR_Unlock(nss_trustload_lock);
+
+  if(cafile)
+    result = nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], cafile, PR_TRUE);
+
+  if(result)
+    return result;
+
+  if(capath) {
+    struct_stat st;
+    if(stat(capath, &st) == -1)
+      return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+
+    if(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
+      PRDirEntry *entry;
+      PRDir *dir = PR_OpenDir(capath);
+      if(!dir)
+        return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+
+      while((entry = PR_ReadDir(dir, PR_SKIP_BOTH | PR_SKIP_HIDDEN))) {
+        char *fullpath = aprintf("%s/%s", capath, entry->name);
+        if(!fullpath) {
+          PR_CloseDir(dir);
+          return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+        }
+
+        if(CURLE_OK != nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], fullpath, PR_TRUE))
+          /* This is purposefully tolerant of errors so non-PEM files can
+           * be in the same directory */
+          infof(data, "failed to load '%s' from CURLOPT_CAPATH\n", fullpath);
+
+        free(fullpath);
+      }
+
+      PR_CloseDir(dir);
+    }
+    else
+      infof(data, "warning: CURLOPT_CAPATH not a directory (%s)\n", capath);
+  }
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_sslver_from_curl(PRUint16 *nssver, long version)
+{
+  switch(version) {
+  case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2:
+    *nssver = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2;
+    return CURLE_OK;
+
+  case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
+    *nssver = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0;
+    return CURLE_OK;
+
+  case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0:
+    *nssver = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
+    return CURLE_OK;
+
+  case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+    *nssver = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
+    return CURLE_OK;
+#else
+    return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+#endif
+
+  case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+    *nssver = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;
+    return CURLE_OK;
+#else
+    return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+#endif
+
+  case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3:
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+    *nssver = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3;
+    return CURLE_OK;
+#else
+    return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+#endif
+
+  default:
+    return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+  }
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_init_sslver(SSLVersionRange *sslver,
+                                struct Curl_easy *data,
+                                struct connectdata *conn)
+{
+  CURLcode result;
+  const long min = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version);
+  const long max = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version_max);
+  SSLVersionRange vrange;
+
+  switch(min) {
+  case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
+  case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
+    /* Bump our minimum TLS version if NSS has stricter requirements. */
+    if(SSL_VersionRangeGetDefault(ssl_variant_stream, &vrange) != SECSuccess)
+      return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+    if(sslver->min < vrange.min)
+      sslver->min = vrange.min;
+    break;
+  default:
+    result = nss_sslver_from_curl(&sslver->min, min);
+    if(result) {
+      failf(data, "unsupported min version passed via CURLOPT_SSLVERSION");
+      return result;
+    }
+  }
+
+  switch(max) {
+  case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_NONE:
+  case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_DEFAULT:
+    break;
+  default:
+    result = nss_sslver_from_curl(&sslver->max, max >> 16);
+    if(result) {
+      failf(data, "unsupported max version passed via CURLOPT_SSLVERSION");
+      return result;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_fail_connect(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
+                                 struct Curl_easy *data,
+                                 CURLcode curlerr)
+{
+  PRErrorCode err = 0;
+
+  if(is_nss_error(curlerr)) {
+    /* read NSPR error code */
+    err = PR_GetError();
+    if(is_cc_error(err))
+      curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+
+    /* print the error number and error string */
+    infof(data, "NSS error %d (%s)\n", err, nss_error_to_name(err));
+
+    /* print a human-readable message describing the error if available */
+    nss_print_error_message(data, err);
+  }
+
+  /* cleanup on connection failure */
+  Curl_llist_destroy(&BACKEND->obj_list, NULL);
+
+  return curlerr;
+}
+
+/* Switch the SSL socket into blocking or non-blocking mode. */
+static CURLcode nss_set_blocking(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
+                                 struct Curl_easy *data,
+                                 bool blocking)
+{
+  static PRSocketOptionData sock_opt;
+  sock_opt.option = PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking;
+  sock_opt.value.non_blocking = !blocking;
+
+  if(PR_SetSocketOption(BACKEND->handle, &sock_opt) != PR_SUCCESS)
+    return nss_fail_connect(connssl, data, CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR);
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+  PRFileDesc *model = NULL;
+  PRFileDesc *nspr_io = NULL;
+  PRFileDesc *nspr_io_stub = NULL;
+  PRBool ssl_no_cache;
+  PRBool ssl_cbc_random_iv;
+  struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+  curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+  CURLcode result;
+  bool second_layer = FALSE;
+  SSLVersionRange sslver_supported;
+
+  SSLVersionRange sslver = {
+    SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0,  /* min */
+#ifdef SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3
+    SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3   /* max */
+#elif defined SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+    SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2
+#elif defined SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+    SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1
+#else
+    SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0
+#endif
+  };
+
+  BACKEND->data = data;
+
+  /* list of all NSS objects we need to destroy in Curl_nss_close() */
+  Curl_llist_init(&BACKEND->obj_list, nss_destroy_object);
+
+  PR_Lock(nss_initlock);
+  result = nss_init(conn->data);
+  if(result) {
+    PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
+    goto error;
+  }
+
+  PK11_SetPasswordFunc(nss_get_password);
+
+  result = nss_load_module(&pem_module, pem_library, "PEM");
+  PR_Unlock(nss_initlock);
+  if(result == CURLE_FAILED_INIT)
+    infof(data, "WARNING: failed to load NSS PEM library %s. Using "
+                "OpenSSL PEM certificates will not work.\n", pem_library);
+  else if(result)
+    goto error;
+
+  result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+
+  model = PR_NewTCPSocket();
+  if(!model)
+    goto error;
+  model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model);
+
+  if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+  if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+  if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+
+  /* do not use SSL cache if disabled or we are not going to verify peer */
+  ssl_no_cache = (SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)
+                  && SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) ? PR_FALSE : PR_TRUE;
+  if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_NO_CACHE, ssl_no_cache) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+
+  /* enable/disable the requested SSL version(s) */
+  if(nss_init_sslver(&sslver, data, conn) != CURLE_OK)
+    goto error;
+  if(SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream,
+                                  &sslver_supported) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+  if(sslver_supported.max < sslver.max && sslver_supported.max >= sslver.min) {
+    char *sslver_req_str, *sslver_supp_str;
+    sslver_req_str = nss_sslver_to_name(sslver.max);
+    sslver_supp_str = nss_sslver_to_name(sslver_supported.max);
+    if(sslver_req_str && sslver_supp_str)
+      infof(data, "Falling back from %s to max supported SSL version (%s)\n",
+                  sslver_req_str, sslver_supp_str);
+    free(sslver_req_str);
+    free(sslver_supp_str);
+    sslver.max = sslver_supported.max;
+  }
+  if(SSL_VersionRangeSet(model, &sslver) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+
+  ssl_cbc_random_iv = !SSL_SET_OPTION(enable_beast);
+#ifdef SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV
+  /* unless the user explicitly asks to allow the protocol vulnerability, we
+     use the work-around */
+  if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, ssl_cbc_random_iv) != SECSuccess)
+    infof(data, "warning: failed to set SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV = %d\n",
+          ssl_cbc_random_iv);
+#else
+  if(ssl_cbc_random_iv)
+    infof(data, "warning: support for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV not compiled in\n");
+#endif
+
+  if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list)) {
+    if(set_ciphers(data, model, SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list)) != SECSuccess) {
+      result = CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
+      goto error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if(!SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer) && SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost))
+    infof(data, "warning: ignoring value of ssl.verifyhost\n");
+
+  /* bypass the default SSL_AuthCertificate() hook in case we do not want to
+   * verify peer */
+  if(SSL_AuthCertificateHook(model, nss_auth_cert_hook, conn) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+
+  /* not checked yet */
+  if(SSL_IS_PROXY())
+    data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult = 0;
+  else
+    data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = 0;
+
+  if(SSL_BadCertHook(model, BadCertHandler, conn) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+
+  if(SSL_HandshakeCallback(model, HandshakeCallback, conn) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+
+  {
+    const CURLcode rv = nss_load_ca_certificates(conn, sockindex);
+    if((rv == CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE) && !SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer))
+      /* not a fatal error because we are not going to verify the peer */
+      infof(data, "warning: CA certificates failed to load\n");
+    else if(rv) {
+      result = rv;
+      goto error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile)) {
+    const CURLcode rv = nss_load_crl(SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile));
+    if(rv) {
+      result = rv;
+      goto error;
+    }
+    infof(data, "  CRLfile: %s\n", SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile));
+  }
+
+  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(cert)) {
+    char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, SSL_SET_OPTION(cert));
+    if(nickname) {
+      /* we are not going to use libnsspem.so to read the client cert */
+      BACKEND->obj_clicert = NULL;
+    }
+    else {
+      CURLcode rv = cert_stuff(conn, sockindex, SSL_SET_OPTION(cert),
+                               SSL_SET_OPTION(key));
+      if(rv) {
+        /* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */
+        result = rv;
+        goto error;
+      }
+    }
+
+    /* store the nickname for SelectClientCert() called during handshake */
+    BACKEND->client_nickname = nickname;
+  }
+  else
+    BACKEND->client_nickname = NULL;
+
+  if(SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(model, SelectClientCert,
+                               (void *)connssl) != SECSuccess) {
+    result = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+    goto error;
+  }
+
+  if(conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].use) {
+    DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connection_complete == conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].state);
+    DEBUGASSERT(conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].backend->handle != NULL);
+    nspr_io = conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].backend->handle;
+    second_layer = TRUE;
+  }
+  else {
+    /* wrap OS file descriptor by NSPR's file descriptor abstraction */
+    nspr_io = PR_ImportTCPSocket(sockfd);
+    if(!nspr_io)
+      goto error;
+  }
+
+  /* create our own NSPR I/O layer */
+  nspr_io_stub = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(nspr_io_identity, &nspr_io_methods);
+  if(!nspr_io_stub) {
+    if(!second_layer)
+      PR_Close(nspr_io);
+    goto error;
+  }
+
+  /* make the per-connection data accessible from NSPR I/O callbacks */
+  nspr_io_stub->secret = (void *)connssl;
+
+  /* push our new layer to the NSPR I/O stack */
+  if(PR_PushIOLayer(nspr_io, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER, nspr_io_stub) != PR_SUCCESS) {
+    if(!second_layer)
+      PR_Close(nspr_io);
+    PR_Close(nspr_io_stub);
+    goto error;
+  }
+
+  /* import our model socket onto the current I/O stack */
+  BACKEND->handle = SSL_ImportFD(model, nspr_io);
+  if(!BACKEND->handle) {
+    if(!second_layer)
+      PR_Close(nspr_io);
+    goto error;
+  }
+
+  PR_Close(model); /* We don't need this any more */
+  model = NULL;
+
+  /* This is the password associated with the cert that we're using */
+  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(key_passwd)) {
+    SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(BACKEND->handle, SSL_SET_OPTION(key_passwd));
+  }
+
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING
+  if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifystatus)) {
+    if(SSL_OptionSet(BACKEND->handle, SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING, PR_TRUE)
+        != SECSuccess)
+      goto error;
+  }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_NPN
+  if(SSL_OptionSet(BACKEND->handle, SSL_ENABLE_NPN, conn->bits.tls_enable_npn
+                   ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_ALPN
+  if(SSL_OptionSet(BACKEND->handle, SSL_ENABLE_ALPN, conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn
+                   ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+#endif
+
+#if NSSVERNUM >= 0x030f04 /* 3.15.4 */
+  if(data->set.ssl.falsestart) {
+    if(SSL_OptionSet(BACKEND->handle, SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START, PR_TRUE)
+        != SECSuccess)
+      goto error;
+
+    if(SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback(BACKEND->handle, CanFalseStartCallback,
+        conn) != SECSuccess)
+      goto error;
+  }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SSL_ENABLE_NPN) || defined(SSL_ENABLE_ALPN)
+  if(conn->bits.tls_enable_npn || conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
+    int cur = 0;
+    unsigned char protocols[128];
+
+#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
+    if(data->set.httpversion >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2 &&
+       (!SSL_IS_PROXY() || !conn->bits.tunnel_proxy)) {
+      protocols[cur++] = NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN;
+      memcpy(&protocols[cur], NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID,
+          NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN);
+      cur += NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN;
+    }
+#endif
+    protocols[cur++] = ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
+    memcpy(&protocols[cur], ALPN_HTTP_1_1, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH);
+    cur += ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
+
+    if(SSL_SetNextProtoNego(BACKEND->handle, protocols, cur) != SECSuccess)
+      goto error;
+  }
+#endif
+
+
+  /* Force handshake on next I/O */
+  if(SSL_ResetHandshake(BACKEND->handle, /* asServer */ PR_FALSE)
+      != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+
+  /* propagate hostname to the TLS layer */
+  if(SSL_SetURL(BACKEND->handle, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->http_proxy.host.name :
+                conn->host.name) != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+
+  /* prevent NSS from re-using the session for a different hostname */
+  if(SSL_SetSockPeerID(BACKEND->handle, SSL_IS_PROXY() ?
+                       conn->http_proxy.host.name : conn->host.name)
+     != SECSuccess)
+    goto error;
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+
+error:
+  if(model)
+    PR_Close(model);
+
+  return nss_fail_connect(connssl, data, result);
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_do_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+  struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+  CURLcode result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+  PRUint32 timeout;
+  long * const certverifyresult = SSL_IS_PROXY() ?
+    &data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult : &data->set.ssl.certverifyresult;
+  const char * const pinnedpubkey = SSL_IS_PROXY() ?
+              data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_PROXY] :
+              data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_ORIG];
+
+
+  /* check timeout situation */
+  const time_t time_left = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
+  if(time_left < 0) {
+    failf(data, "timed out before SSL handshake");
+    result = CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
+    goto error;
+  }
+
+  /* Force the handshake now */
+  timeout = PR_MillisecondsToInterval((PRUint32) time_left);
+  if(SSL_ForceHandshakeWithTimeout(BACKEND->handle, timeout) != SECSuccess) {
+    if(PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+      /* blocking direction is updated by nss_update_connecting_state() */
+      return CURLE_AGAIN;
+    else if(*certverifyresult == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN)
+      result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+    else if(*certverifyresult != 0)
+      result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+    goto error;
+  }
+
+  result = display_conn_info(conn, BACKEND->handle);
+  if(result)
+    goto error;
+
+  if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) {
+    SECStatus ret = SECFailure;
+    char *nickname = dup_nickname(data, SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
+    if(nickname) {
+      /* we support only nicknames in case of issuercert for now */
+      ret = check_issuer_cert(BACKEND->handle, nickname);
+      free(nickname);
+    }
+
+    if(SECFailure == ret) {
+      infof(data, "SSL certificate issuer check failed\n");
+      result = CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
+      goto error;
+    }
+    else {
+      infof(data, "SSL certificate issuer check ok\n");
+    }
+  }
+
+  result = cmp_peer_pubkey(connssl, pinnedpubkey);
+  if(result)
+    /* status already printed */
+    goto error;
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+
+error:
+  return nss_fail_connect(connssl, data, result);
+}
+
+static CURLcode nss_connect_common(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex,
+                                   bool *done)
+{
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+  struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+  const bool blocking = (done == NULL);
+  CURLcode result;
+
+  if(connssl->state == ssl_connection_complete) {
+    if(!blocking)
+      *done = TRUE;
+    return CURLE_OK;
+  }
+
+  if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_1) {
+    result = nss_setup_connect(conn, sockindex);
+    if(result)
+      /* we do not expect CURLE_AGAIN from nss_setup_connect() */
+      return result;
+
+    connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
+  }
+
+  /* enable/disable blocking mode before handshake */
+  result = nss_set_blocking(connssl, data, blocking);
+  if(result)
+    return result;
+
+  result = nss_do_connect(conn, sockindex);
+  switch(result) {
+  case CURLE_OK:
+    break;
+  case CURLE_AGAIN:
+    if(!blocking)
+      /* CURLE_AGAIN in non-blocking mode is not an error */
+      return CURLE_OK;
+    /* FALLTHROUGH */
+  default:
+    return result;
+  }
+
+  if(blocking) {
+    /* in blocking mode, set NSS non-blocking mode _after_ SSL handshake */
+    result = nss_set_blocking(connssl, data, /* blocking */ FALSE);
+    if(result)
+      return result;
+  }
+  else
+    /* signal completed SSL handshake */
+    *done = TRUE;
+
+  connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete;
+  conn->recv[sockindex] = nss_recv;
+  conn->send[sockindex] = nss_send;
+
+  /* ssl_connect_done is never used outside, go back to the initial state */
+  connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_1;
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static CURLcode Curl_nss_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+  return nss_connect_common(conn, sockindex, /* blocking */ NULL);
+}
+
+static CURLcode Curl_nss_connect_nonblocking(struct connectdata *conn,
+                                             int sockindex, bool *done)
+{
+  return nss_connect_common(conn, sockindex, done);
+}
+
+static ssize_t nss_send(struct connectdata *conn,  /* connection data */
+                        int sockindex,             /* socketindex */
+                        const void *mem,           /* send this data */
+                        size_t len,                /* amount to write */
+                        CURLcode *curlcode)
+{
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+  ssize_t rc;
+
+  /* The SelectClientCert() hook uses this for infof() and failf() but the
+     handle stored in nss_setup_connect() could have already been freed. */
+  BACKEND->data = conn->data;
+
+  rc = PR_Send(BACKEND->handle, mem, (int)len, 0, PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+  if(rc < 0) {
+    PRInt32 err = PR_GetError();
+    if(err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+      *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
+    else {
+      /* print the error number and error string */
+      const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err);
+      infof(conn->data, "SSL write: error %d (%s)\n", err, err_name);
+
+      /* print a human-readable message describing the error if available */
+      nss_print_error_message(conn->data, err);
+
+      *curlcode = (is_cc_error(err))
+        ? CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM
+        : CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  return rc; /* number of bytes */
+}
+
+static ssize_t nss_recv(struct connectdata *conn,  /* connection data */
+                        int sockindex,             /* socketindex */
+                        char *buf,                 /* store read data here */
+                        size_t buffersize,         /* max amount to read */
+                        CURLcode *curlcode)
+{
+  struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+  ssize_t nread;
+
+  /* The SelectClientCert() hook uses this for infof() and failf() but the
+     handle stored in nss_setup_connect() could have already been freed. */
+  BACKEND->data = conn->data;
+
+  nread = PR_Recv(BACKEND->handle, buf, (int)buffersize, 0,
+                  PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT);
+  if(nread < 0) {
+    /* failed SSL read */
+    PRInt32 err = PR_GetError();
+
+    if(err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
+      *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
+    else {
+      /* print the error number and error string */
+      const char *err_name = nss_error_to_name(err);
+      infof(conn->data, "SSL read: errno %d (%s)\n", err, err_name);
+
+      /* print a human-readable message describing the error if available */
+      nss_print_error_message(conn->data, err);
+
+      *curlcode = (is_cc_error(err))
+        ? CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM
+        : CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  return nread;
+}
+
+static size_t Curl_nss_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+  return msnprintf(buffer, size, "NSS/%s", NSS_VERSION);
+}
+
+/* data might be NULL */
+static int Curl_nss_seed(struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+  /* make sure that NSS is initialized */
+  return !!Curl_nss_force_init(data);
+}
+
+/* data might be NULL */
+static CURLcode Curl_nss_random(struct Curl_easy *data,
+                                unsigned char *entropy,
+                                size_t length)
+{
+  Curl_nss_seed(data);  /* Initiate the seed if not already done */
+
+  if(SECSuccess != PK11_GenerateRandom(entropy, curlx_uztosi(length)))
+    /* signal a failure */
+    return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static CURLcode Curl_nss_md5sum(unsigned char *tmp, /* input */
+                                size_t tmplen,
+                                unsigned char *md5sum, /* output */
+                                size_t md5len)
+{
+  PK11Context *MD5pw = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5);
+  unsigned int MD5out;
+
+  PK11_DigestOp(MD5pw, tmp, curlx_uztoui(tmplen));
+  PK11_DigestFinal(MD5pw, md5sum, &MD5out, curlx_uztoui(md5len));
+  PK11_DestroyContext(MD5pw, PR_TRUE);
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static CURLcode Curl_nss_sha256sum(const unsigned char *tmp, /* input */
+                               size_t tmplen,
+                               unsigned char *sha256sum, /* output */
+                               size_t sha256len)
+{
+  PK11Context *SHA256pw = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA256);
+  unsigned int SHA256out;
+
+  PK11_DigestOp(SHA256pw, tmp, curlx_uztoui(tmplen));
+  PK11_DigestFinal(SHA256pw, sha256sum, &SHA256out, curlx_uztoui(sha256len));
+  PK11_DestroyContext(SHA256pw, PR_TRUE);
+
+  return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static bool Curl_nss_cert_status_request(void)
+{
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING
+  return TRUE;
+#else
+  return FALSE;
+#endif
+}
+
+static bool Curl_nss_false_start(void)
+{
+#if NSSVERNUM >= 0x030f04 /* 3.15.4 */
+  return TRUE;
+#else
+  return FALSE;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void *Curl_nss_get_internals(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
+                                    CURLINFO info UNUSED_PARAM)
+{
+  (void)info;
+  return BACKEND->handle;
+}
+
+const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_nss = {
+  { CURLSSLBACKEND_NSS, "nss" }, /* info */
+
+  SSLSUPP_CA_PATH |
+  SSLSUPP_CERTINFO |
+  SSLSUPP_PINNEDPUBKEY |
+  SSLSUPP_HTTPS_PROXY,
+
+  sizeof(struct ssl_backend_data),
+
+  Curl_nss_init,                /* init */
+  Curl_nss_cleanup,             /* cleanup */
+  Curl_nss_version,             /* version */
+  Curl_nss_check_cxn,           /* check_cxn */
+  /* NSS has no shutdown function provided and thus always fail */
+  Curl_none_shutdown,           /* shutdown */
+  Curl_none_data_pending,       /* data_pending */
+  Curl_nss_random,              /* random */
+  Curl_nss_cert_status_request, /* cert_status_request */
+  Curl_nss_connect,             /* connect */
+  Curl_nss_connect_nonblocking, /* connect_nonblocking */
+  Curl_nss_get_internals,       /* get_internals */
+  Curl_nss_close,               /* close_one */
+  Curl_none_close_all,          /* close_all */
+  /* NSS has its own session ID cache */
+  Curl_none_session_free,       /* session_free */
+  Curl_none_set_engine,         /* set_engine */
+  Curl_none_set_engine_default, /* set_engine_default */
+  Curl_none_engines_list,       /* engines_list */
+  Curl_nss_false_start,         /* false_start */
+  Curl_nss_md5sum,              /* md5sum */
+  Curl_nss_sha256sum            /* sha256sum */
+};
+
+#endif /* USE_NSS */