Apply patches for proper STUN message validation: 1. Validate the size of an attribute before returning it to the caller. Previously this was being done in stun_attr_get_next_str() to check that the previous attribute didn't exceed the size of the underlying buffer, however by that point any maliciously crafted attributes would have already had their chance to attack the caller. commit 9b8baa805582ae66d2a1ed68483609f90fcfb4d0 2. Validate the size of the buffer in stun_get_command_message_len_str(). Without this the caller could read off the end of the underlying buffer if it receives a maliciously crafted packet with an invalid header size. commit 14cb1c94e7be98869f45678ba195a26796a797c4 3. Changed type from int to size_t to avoid warning. warning: comparison between signed and unsigned integer expressions commit 4722697645cf033de8cf4f34e4214af750746365 See also: https://github.com/coturn/coturn/pull/472

--- src/apps/common/hiredis_libevent2.h.orig	2019-03-02 21:06:19 UTC
+++ src/apps/common/hiredis_libevent2.h
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ typedef void* redis_context_handle;
 
 void redis_async_init(void);
 
-redis_context_handle redisLibeventAttach(struct event_base *base, char *ip, int port, char *pwd, int db);
+redis_context_handle redisLibeventAttach(struct event_base *base, char *ip, int port, char *pwd, char *usocket, int db);
 
 void send_message_to_redis(redis_context_handle rch, const char *command, const char *key, const char *format,...);